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ABSTRACT
I consider some of the leading arguments for assigning an important role to tracking the growth of
monetary aggregates when making decisions about monetary policy. First, I consider whether ignoring
money means returning to the conceptual framework that allowed the high inflation of the 1970s. Second,
I consider whether models of inflation determination with no role for money are incomplete, or inconsistent
with elementary economic principles. Third, I consider the implications for monetary policy strategy
of the empirical evidence for a long-run relationship between money growth and inflation. And fourth,
I consider reasons why a monetary policy strategy based solely on short-run inflation forecasts derived
from a Phillips curve may not be a reliable way of controlling inflation. I argue that none of these considerations
provides a compelling reason to assign a prominent role to monetary aggregates in the conduct of monetary
policy.
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michael.woodford@columbia.eduIt might be thought obvious that a policy aimed at controlling in°ation should
concern itself with ensuring a modest rate of growth of the money supply. After all,
every beginning student of economics is familiar with Milton Friedman's dictum that
\in°ation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon" (e.g., Friedman, 1992),
and with the quantity theory of money as a standard account of what determines the
in°ation rate. Yet nowadays monetary aggregates play little role in monetary policy
deliberations at most central banks. King (2002, p. 162) quotes then-Fed Governor
Larry Meyer as stating that \money plays no explicit role in today's consensus macro
model, and it plays virtually no role in the conduct of monetary policy."
Not all agree that this de-emphasis of money growth as a criterion for judging
the soundness of policy has been a good thing. Notably, the European Central Bank
continues to assign a prominent role to money in its monetary policy strategy. In
what the ECB calls its \two-pillar strategy," one pillar is \economic analysis," which
\assesses the short-to-medium-term determinants of price developments." According
to the ECB, this analysis \takes account of the fact that price developments over those
horizons are in°uenced largely by the interplay of supply and demand in the goods,
services and factor markets." But in addition, a second pillar, \monetary analysis",
assesses the medium-to-long-term outlook for in°ation, \exploiting the long-run link
between money and prices." The two alternative frameworks for assessing risks to
price stability are intended to provide \cross-checks" for one another (ECB, 2004, p.
55).
But what exactly is the nature of the additional information that can be obtained
by tracking trends in the growth of monetary aggregates, and why should it be of such
crucial importance for the control of in°ation as to constitute a separate \pillar" (not
infrequently characterized as the \¯rst pillar") of the ECB's policy strategy? And
does \monetary analysis" genuinely represent a distinct and complementary perspec-
tive on the determinants of in°ation, that cannot be subsumed into an \economic
analysis" of the in°ationary pressures resulting from the balance of supply and de-
mand in product and factor markets, and that can be used to guide policy decisions?
I here review several of the most important arguments that have been made
for paying attention to money, considering both the purported omissions made by
\economic analysis" alone and the asserted advantages of the information revealed
by monetary trends. Of course, it is impossible to review the voluminous literature
on this topic in its entirety, so I shall have to stick to a few of the most prominent
themes in recent discussions.
1First, I consider whether ignoring money means returning to the conceptual frame-
work that allowed the high in°ation of the 1970s. The architects of the ECB's mon-
etary policy strategy were undoubtedly concerned not to repeat past mistakes that
have often been attributed to a failure to appreciate the role of money in in°ation
determination. Have those central banks that assign little importance to money, like
the current Federal Reserve, forgotten the lessons of the crucial debates of a quarter
century ago? Second, I consider the theoretical status of models of in°ation deter-
mination with no role for money. Are such models incomplete, and hence unable to
explain in°ation without adding the additional information provided by a speci¯ca-
tion of the money supply? Or, even if complete, are they inconsistent with elementary
economic principles, such as the neutrality of money? Third, I consider the implica-
tions for monetary policy strategy of the empirical evidence for a long-run relationship
between money growth and in°ation. And ¯nally, I consider reasons why a monetary
policy strategy based solely on short-run in°ation forecasts derived from a Phillips
curve may not be a reliable way of controlling in°ation, and ask whether \monetary
analysis" is an appropriate way to increase the robustness of the conclusions reached
regarding the conduct of policy.
1 The Historical Signi¯cance of Monetarism
One of the more obvious reasons for the ECB's continuing emphasis on the prominent
role of money in its deliberations is a concern not to ignore the lessons of the mone-
tarist controversies of the 1960s and 1970s. Monetarists faced substantial opposition
to their theses at the time, but they largely won the argument with their Keynesian
critics, especially in the minds of central bankers. Moreover, those central banks,
such as the Bundesbank, that took on board monetarist teachings to the greatest
extent had the best performance with regard to in°ation control in the 1970s and
1980s. Hence it may be feared that abandoning an emphasis on monetary aggregates
in the conduct of monetary policy would mean returning to the intellectual frame-
work of 1960s-vintage Keynesianism, with the consequent risk of allowing a return of
the runaway in°ation experienced in many countries in the 1970s.1
1For example, Lucas (2006) admits that \central banks that do not make explicit use of money
supply data have recent histories of in°ation control that are quite as good as the record of the
ECB," but then warns: \I am concerned that this encouraging but brief period of success will foster
2But is this fear well-founded? Monetarism did surely represent an important
advance over prior conventional wisdom, and it would indeed be a grave mistake to
forget the lessons learned from the monetarist controversy. Yet I would argue that the
most important of these lessons, and the ones that are of greatest continuing relevance
to the conduct of policy today, are not dependent on the thesis of the importance of
monetary aggregates.2
First, monetarism established that monetary policy can do something about in-
°ation, and that the central bank can reasonably be held accountable for controlling
in°ation. This was not always accepted | in the 1950s and 1960s, many Keynesian
models treated the general price level as given, independent of policy, or only a®ected
by policy under relatively extreme circumstances (when capacity constraints were
reached), but not in the most common situation. Even in the 1970s, when in°ation
could no longer be considered a minor detail in macroeconomic modeling, it was often
argued to be due to the market power of monopolists or labor unions rather than to
monetary policy.
Monetarists contested these skeptical theses about the possibility of controlling
in°ation through monetary policy, and the quantity theory of money provided them
with an important argument. Given that central banks obviously could a®ect | and
even to a certain extent control | the quantity of money, the quantity-theoretic view
of in°ation made it clear that central banks could a®ect in°ation, and indeed could
contain it, at least over the medium-to-long run, if they had the will to do so.
But it is not true that monitoring monetary aggregates is the only way that a
central bank can control in°ation. Present-day central banks that pay little attention
to money do not, as a consequence, deny their responsibility for in°ation control. To
the contrary, many have public in°ation targets, and accept that keeping in°ation
near that target is their primary responsibility. And while the Fed has no explicit
target of this kind, Federal Reserve o±cials speak often and forcefully about their
the opinion, already widely held, that the monetary pillar is super°uous, and lead monetary policy
analysis back to the muddled eclecticism that brought us the 1970s in°ation" (p. 137).
2I do not pretend, of course, in the brief discussion that follows, to provide an exhaustive account
of the desirable elements in monetarist thought. Many other ideas originated or championed by
monetarists, such as the importance of the distinction between real and nominal interest rates and
the concept of the natural rate of output, have had a profound e®ect on contemporary monetary
economics and policy analysis | but these are even more obviously independent of any thesis about
the importance of monetary aggregates.
3determination to ensure price stability, and the record of the past decade makes such
statements highly credible. Nor do the models used for policy analysis within such
banks, even when these do not involve money at all, imply that monetary policy
cannot a®ect in°ation, as is discussed further in the next section.
Second, monetarism emphasized the importance of a veri¯able commitment by
the central bank to a non-in°ationary policy. Monetarists were the ¯rst to empha-
size the importance of containing in°ation expectations, and to stress the role that
commitment to a policy rule could play in creating the kind of expectations needed
for macroeconomic stability. Research over the past several decades has only added
further support for these views.3
The prescription of a money growth target provided a simple example of a kind of
commitment on the part of a central bank that should guarantee low in°ation, at least
over the long run, and moreover of a type that would be relatively straightforward
for the public to monitor.4 But, once again, this is not the only kind of commitment
that would serve, and a central bank can fully accept the importance of commitment,
and of making its commitments clear to the public, without having a money growth
target. Indeed, in°ation targeting central banks do clearly bind themselves to a
speci¯c, quantitative commitment regarding what their policy will aim at, and they
have given great attention to the issue of how to show the public that their policy
decisions are justi¯ed by their o±cial target, notably through the publication of
In°ation Reports like those of the Bank of England or the Swedish Riksbank.
Thus in neither case does preservation of the important insights obtained from
the monetarist controversy depend on continuing to emphasize monetary aggregates
in policy deliberations. And the fact that in°ation targeting central banks dispense
with monetary targets and analyze their policy options using models with no role for
money does not imply any return to the policy framework that led to (or at any rate
allowed) the in°ation of the 1970s.5 Indeed, not even Milton Friedman continued, in
3For example, both the importance of expectations in the monetary transmission mechanism and
the advantages of suitably designed policy rules are central themes of Woodford (2003).
4Neumann (2006), in a review of monetary targeting by the Bundesbank, stresses the desire to
in°uence public expectations of in°ation as a central motivation for the strategy and a key element
in its success.
5In section 4 I consider some speci¯c errors in policy analysis that may have contributed to the
\Great In°ation" of the 1970s, and discuss whether the avoidance of such errors requires a central
bank to monitor the supply of money.
4his later years, to view monetary targets as a prerequisite for controlling in°ation.6
Are there nonetheless reasons to assign a greater importance to money than central
banks other than the ECB generally do at present? To consider this, it is useful
to begin with a discussion of the theoretical framework behind optimization-based
dynamic general-equilibrium models such as that of Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007),
now widely used for quantitative policy analysis in central banks, and the role of
money in such models.
2 Can One Understand In°ation without Money?
A ¯rst question about the role of monetary aggregates in a sound strategy for mon-
etary policy is whether one can reasonably base policy decisions on models of the
transmission mechanism for monetary policy that make no reference to monetary
aggregates. Many of the quantitative models now used in central banks are of this
kind, and this is surely one of the reasons for the minor role now played by monetary
statistics in policy deliberations at many central banks, as the quotation above from
Larry Meyer indicates. But is there perhaps something inherently problematic about
relying upon models with this feature, especially in a central bank which takes the
maintenance of price stability as its primary objective? At the ECB, for example, the
fact that \economic analysis" of in°ation risks is expected to mean analysis in the
context of models that include no role for money is one of the primary justi¯cations
given for the inclusion of a second \pillar" of the policy strategy, the cross-check
provided by monetary analysis.7
6Simon London (2003) reports an interview in which Friedman stated that \the use of quantity
of money as a target has not been a success," and that \I'm not sure I would as of today push it as
hard as I once did." In a more recent interview, Robert Kuttner (2006) quotes Friedman as having
said,\I believe [that] economists in general have ... overestimate[d] how hard it is to maintain a
stable price level. We've all worked on getting rules, my money rule and others, [on the ground
that] it's such a hard job to keep prices stable. Then along comes the 1980s, and central banks all
over the world target price stability; and lo and behold, all of them basically succeed.... So it must
be that that [it] is easier to do than we thought it was.... Once [central banks] really understood
that avoiding in°ation, keeping prices stable, was their real objective, their ¯rst order objective, and
put that above everything else, they all turned out to be able to do it."
7According to the ECB, an important limitation of \economic analysis" is the fact that \impor-
tant information, such as that contained in monetary aggregates, is not easily integrated into the
framework used to produce the [sta® macroeconomic] projections" (ECB, 2004, p. 61).
5There are a variety of misgivings that one might have about the soundness of
\cashless" models as a basis for policy analysis. One sort of doubt may concern
their theoretical coherence, or at least their consistency with a fundamental princi-
ple of economic theory, the neutrality of money. One might suppose that a model
that makes no reference to must either be inconsistent with monetary neutrality, or
leave the general level of prices indeterminate | so that such a model could not be
used to predict the consequences for in°ation of alternative policies. Alternatively,
one might suppose that the models are coherent as far as they go, but that they
are incomplete. For example, Nelson (2003) argues that standard \new Keynesian"
models that make no reference to money only model the (temporary) departures of
the in°ation rate from an assumed long-run steady-state in°ation rate, and that this
steady-state in°ation rate can only be understood by taking account of the long-run
growth rate of money. And ¯nally, even if one grants that cashless models provide a
theoretically coherent account of in°ation determination, it may be argued that they
°y in the face of well-established empirical regularities. For example, Alvarez, Lucas
and Weber (2001, p. 219) assert that current consensus models involve \a rejection
of the quantity theory," and argue as a consequence that some quite di®erent theory
of the monetary transmission mechanism needs to be developed.
2.1 A Model without Money
In order to address these questions about the general structure of \cashless" models
of in°ation determination, it is useful to give an explicit example of a model of this
kind. The most basic \new Keynesian" model8 consists of three equations. The ¯rst
is an aggregate supply relation,9
¼t ¡ ¹ ¼t = ·log(Yt=Y
n
t ) + ¯Et[¼t+1 ¡ ¹ ¼t+1] + ut; (2.1)
8In Woodford (2003) I call models of this kind \neo-Wicksellian," in order to draw attention
to the fundamental role in such models of a transmission mechanism in which interest rates a®ect
intertemporal spending decisions, so that monetary policy need not be speci¯ed in terms of an
implied path for the money supply; but the terminology \new Keynesian" for such models has
become commonplace, following Clarida et al. (1999) among others.
9See Woodford (2003, chaps. 3-5) for discussion of the microeconomic foundations underlying
equations (2.1) and (2.2), as well as more complicated versions of the model, including some small
empirical models that are close cousins of the model presented here.
6where ¼t represents the rate of in°ation between periods t and t + 1, ¹ ¼t is the per-
ceived rate of \trend in°ation" at date t, Yt is aggregate output, Y n
t is the \natural
rate of output" (a function of exogenous real factors, including both technology and
household preferences), ut is a possible additional exogenous \cost-push" disturbance,
and the coe±cients satisfy · > 0;0 < ¯ < 1: This equation represents a log-linear
approximation to the dynamics of aggregate in°ation in a model of staggered price-
setting of the kind ¯rst proposed by Calvo (1983) and incorporated into a complete
monetary DSGE model by Yun (1996). In the variant of the model presented here, in
periods when ¯rms do not re-optimize their prices, they automatically increase their
prices at the trend in°ation rate ¹ ¼t; departures of aggregate output from the natural
rate and/or cost-push shocks give ¯rms that re-optimize their prices an incentive to
choose a price increase di®erent from the trend rate, and so create a gap between
¼t and ¹ ¼t: This assumption of automatic indexation was ¯rst used in the empirical
model of Smets and Wouters (2003), who assume indexation to the current in°ation
target of the central bank,10 as discussed further below.
The second equation is a log-linear approximation to an Euler equation for the
timing of aggregate expenditure,
log(Yt=Y
n
t ) = Et[log(Yt+1=Y
n
t+1] ¡ ¾[it ¡ Et¼t+1 ¡ r
n
t ]; (2.2)
sometimes called an \intertemporal IS relation," by analogy to the role of the IS
curve in Hicks' exposition of the basic Keynesian model. Here it is a short-term
nominal interest rate (a riskless \one-period rate" in the theoretical model, earned on
money-market instruments held between periods t and t+1) and rn
t is the Wicksellian
\natural rate of interest" (a function of exogenous real factors, like the natural rate
of output). This equation is the one that indicates how monetary policy a®ects
aggregate expenditure: the expected short-term real rate of return determines the
incentive for intertemporal substitution between expenditure in periods t and t + 1:
The equation is here written in terms of the output gap log(Yt=Y n
t ) rather than the
level of aggregate real expenditure Yt in order to facilitate solution of the model.
The remaining equation required to close the system is a speci¯cation of monetary
policy. We might, for example, specify policy by a rule of the kind proposed by Taylor
10Actually, their empirical model assumes indexation to an average of the current in°ation target
and a recent past in°ation rate. The assumption here of simple indexation to the in°ation trend
or in°ation target simpli¯es the algebra of the discussion below of equilibrium determination, while
still conveying the essential °avor of the Smets-Wouters model of price adjustment.
7(1993) for the central bank's operating target for the short-term nominal interest rate,
it = r
¤
t + ¹ ¼t + Á¼(¼t ¡ ¹ ¼t) + Áy log(Yt=Y
n
t ): (2.3)
Here ¹ ¼t is the central bank's in°ation target at any point in time, and r¤
t represents the
central bank's view of the economy's equilibrium (or natural) real rate of interest, and
hence its estimate of where the intercept needs to be in order for this policy rule to be
consistent with the in°ation target; Á¼ and Áy are positive coe±cients indicating the
degree to which the central bank responds to observed departures of in°ation from the
target rate or of output from the natural rate respectively. I shall assume that both
¹ ¼t and r¤
t are exogenous processes, the evolution of which represent shifts in attitudes
within the central taken to be independent of what is happening to the evolution of
in°ation or real activity. This is a simpli¯ed version (because the relation is purely
contemporaneous) of the empirical central-bank reaction function used to specify
monetary policy in the empirical model of Smets and Wouters (2003). Note that
while (2.3) includes two distinct types of \monetary policy shocks," corresponding to
innovations in r¤
t and ¹ ¼t respectively, there is no economic signi¯cance to anything but
the sum r¤
t +(1¡Á¼)¹ ¼t; the two components are empirically identi¯ed only insofar as
their °uctuations are assumed to exhibit di®erent degrees of persistence. Like Smets
and Wouters, I shall assume that the in°ation target follows a random walk,
¹ ¼t = ¹ ¼t¡1 + º
¼
t ; (2.4)
where º¼
t is an i.i.d. shock with mean zero, while r¤
t is stationary (or, if the natural
rate of interest has a unit root, r¤
t ¡ rn
t is stationary).
It might be thought unrealistic to assume that the output gap to which the central
bank responds is identical to the theoretical conception of the output gap that appears
in the aggregate-supply relation (2.1). However, if the central bank responds to a
di®erent measure (for example, to logYt minus a deterministic trend), the discrepancy
between the central bank's conception of the output gap and the theoretically relevant
one can be taken to be included in the intercept term r¤
t. (As long as the discrepancy
is a function of purely exogenous variables, as in the example just proposed, this
changes nothing in my analysis.)
It might also be thought extraordinary to suppose that the in°ation target of the
central bank, denoted ¹ ¼t in (2.3), should coincide with the rate of in°ation, denoted
¹ ¼t in (2.1), to which price-setters index their prices when not re-optimizing them.
8One interpretation of this, proposed by Smets and Wouters, is that the private sector
observes the central bank's in°ation target and indexes prices to it. If one does not
wish to postulate a behavioral relation for the private sector that depends on an
assumption of a particular type of monetary policy (namely, the existence of a well-
de¯ned in°ation target at each point in time), one can interpret the indexation rate
¹ ¼t in (2.1) as the Beveridge-Nelson (stochastic) trend of the in°ation process,11
¹ ¼t ´ lim
T!1
Et¼T: (2.5)
As we shall see, in the equilibrium of the present model, the in°ation rate ¼t °uc-
tuates around a stochastic trend given by the central bank's in°ation target, and
since (2.4) implies that Et¹ ¼T = ¹ ¼t for any future date T, under de¯nition (2.5) the
indexation rate will in fact equal the central bank's in°ation target at each point in
time, assuming that this is part of the information set of price-setters.
2.2 Can Such a Model Explain the Rate of In°ation?
A ¯rst question about this model is whether such a model | which has thus far made
no reference to the economy's supply of money | has any implication for the general
level of prices and for the rate of in°ation. It is easily shown that it does. Using (2.3)
to substitute for it in (2.2), the pair of equations (2.1) { (2.2) can be written in the
form
zt = A Etzt+1 + a (r
n
t ¡ r
¤
t); (2.6)
where
zt ´
"
¼t ¡ ¹ ¼t
log(Yt=Y n
t )
#
A is a 2 £ 2 matrix of coe±cients and a is a 2-vector of coe±cients. The system
(2.6) has a unique non-explosive solution (a solution in which both elements of zt are
stationary processes, under the maintained assumption that the exogenous process
11This is well-de¯ned as long as monetary policy implies that the in°ation rate is di®erence-
stationary, and that the ¯rst di®erence of in°ation has an unconditional mean of zero, i.e., there is
no long-run in°ation trend. Atheoretical characterizations of in°ation dynamics in countries like the
US, that lack an o±cial in°ation target, often have this property (e.g., Stock and Watson, 2006).
And the model sketched here implies that equilibrium in°ation should have this property as well.
9rn
t ¡r¤
t is stationary) as long as both eigenvalues of A are inside the unit circle;12 this
condition holds if13
Á¼ +
1 ¡ ¯
·
Áy > 1: (2.7)
If this condition holds (as it does for many empirical Taylor rules), the unique non-
explosive solution is given by
zt =
1 X
j=0
A
ja Et[r
n
t+j ¡ r
¤
t+j]: (2.8)
This implies, in particular, a solution for equilibrium in°ation of the form
¼t = ¹ ¼t +
1 X
j=0
ÃjEt[r
n
t+j ¡ r
¤
t+j]; (2.9)
where
Ãj ´ [10] A
j a
for each j:14 This shows how in°ation is determined by the in°ation target of the
central bank, and by current and expected future discrepancies between the natural
rate of interest and the intercept adjustment made to central bank's reaction function.
(If the intercept r¤
t is adjusted so as to perfectly track rn
t ; the central bank should
perfectly achieve its in°ation target.) So the model does imply a determinate in°ation
rate. Moreover, given an initial price level (a historical fact at the time that one begins
to implement the policy represented by equation (2.3)), the model correspondingly
implies a determinate path for the price level.15
12The analysis here treats the in°ation trend to which price-setters index in (2.1) as being given
by the central bank's in°ation target in (2.3); thus the ¹ ¼t appearing in both equations represents
the same quantity, and this is exogenously speci¯ed by (2.4). If, instead, one supposes that the ¹ ¼t
appearing in (2.1) is de¯ned by (2.5), one must consider the possibility of an equilibrium in which
the in°ation trend di®ers from the central bank's target rate. But one can show that under the
condition (2.7) stated in the text, there cannot exist an equilibrium of that kind.
13See Woodford (2003, Prop. 4.3). Note that in equation (2.7) there, a factor of 4 appears,
because the Taylor-rule coe±cients are quoted for the case in which the interest rate and in°ation
rate are annualized, while the \period" of the discrete-time model is assumed to be a quarter. Here
instead (2.3) is written in terms of \one-period" rates for simplicity.
14For plots of these coe±cients in some numerical examples, see Woodford (2003, Figs. 4.5, 4.6).
The coe±cients are denoted Ã
¼
j in the ¯gures.
15It is not true, as sometimes supposed, that the initial price level fails to be determined by the
10Does the fact that this model determines the equilibrium price level without any
reference to the money supply imply a violation of the long-established economic prin-
ciple of the neutrality of money? It does not. The most important aspect of monetary
neutrality, and the one that represents a genuinely deep principle of economic theory,
is the proposition that decisions about the supply and demand of goods and services
should (if decisionmakers are rational) depend only on the relative prices of di®erent
goods, and not on the absolute price (price in terms of money) of anything. This
has an important implication for the theory of in°ation, which is that one cannot
expect there to be a theory of the general price level (at least, not one founded on
rationality and intertemporal general equilibrium) for a world without government
| in the way that one can, for example, speak of what the relative price of oil would
be in a hypothetical world in which there were no government petroleum reserves or
other government interventions in the market for oil. The equilibrium price level, or
alternatively the real purchasing power of the monetary unit, depends crucially on
government policy, and more speci¯cally on monetary policy: it is only the fact that
the central bank's actions are not independent of the absolute price level that gives
a nation's currency unit any speci¯c economic signi¯cance.16
Thus one should not expect a well-formulated model to explain the general level
of prices except as a result of the way in which monetary policy is speci¯ed. But this
does not mean that the model must involve any reference to the supply of money.
For example, the monetary policy rule might specify that the national currency is
convertible into some real commodity (gold being the most popular choice, histori-
cally). The parity at which the central bank is committed to maintain convertibility
model. If t0 is the ¯rst period in which the policy begins to be implemented, a higher price level Pt0
will correspond to a higher in°ation rate ¼t0 and so will provoke a higher interest-rate target from
the central bank. Given the value of Pt0¡1; which is at that point a historical fact | and not one
that is irrelevant for the central bank's policy rule | there is a uniquely determined equilibrium
value for Pt0; and similarly for Pt in any period t ¸ t0:
16In theory, it is possible to have a regime under which the equilibrium price level is determined
by ¯scal policy, even though the central bank behaves in a way that is independent of the absolute
level of prices; this is illustrated by the theory of the functioning of a wartime bond price-support
regime proposed in Woodford (2001). I shall leave aside this possibility, however, for purposes of the
present discussion. Even if one accepts this type of regime as a theoretical possibility, there is no
reason to think of it as a practical alternative to the assignment to the central bank of responsibility
for maintaining price stability; the adoption of such schemes during wartime represents a temporary
sacri¯ce of the goal of in°ation control to increased °exibility of government ¯nance.
11is then the crucial determinant of the real purchasing power of the currency unit;
the nominal stock of money that ends up being held in such an economy is neither a
policy decision by the central bank nor an essential element of an account of equilib-
rium determination under such a regime. The kind of policy represented by (2.3) is
another example of a way that a central-bank policy that does not involve a target
for the quantity of money, and that can be implemented without even measuring any
monetary aggregates, can determine the general level of prices.
The model is in fact fully consistent with monetary neutrality, as I have de¯ned
this principle above. Each of the two private-sector behavioral relations, (2.1) and
(2.2), relates real variables only to relative prices. Indeed, not only is the absolute level
of prices irrelevant in these equations, but the absolute rate of in°ation is irrelevant
as well (a property sometimes referred to as \superneutrality"): in (2.1) only the
in°ation rate relative to the in°ation trend matters, and in (2.2) only the in°ation
rate relative to the nominal interest rate matters. Thus a permanent increase in
the in°ation rate (shifting the perceived in°ation trend by the same amount), if
accompanied by a corresponding increase in the level of nominal interest rates (so as
to keep the short-run real rate of interest unchanged), would make the same pattern
of real economic activity over time consistent with these equations. The equilibrium
in°ation rate is only determinate because the policy rule (2.3) does not have this
property.
It is sometimes asserted that models like the one sketched above do not actually
explain the rate of in°ation without reference to money growth, but only departures
of in°ation from its trend rate, with the trend needing to be determined somewhere
else | speci¯cally, by the long-run rate of money growth. For example, Nelson
(2003, sec. 2.2) attributes to McCallum (2001) the argument that in such models
\in°ation ... can still be regarded as pinned down in the long run by the economy's
steady-state nominal money growth rate."17 In particular, Nelson argues that because
equations like (2.1) { (2.3) have been log-linearized, analyses using these equations
17This is not an obvious reading of what McCallum (2001) actually says. McCallum is concerned
with whether the aggregate-supply relation alone can be viewed as determining the equilibrium
in°ation rate, independently of monetary policy; and his answer is that, in the new Keynesian model
that he discusses, \the long-run average rate of in°ation ... is controlled entirely by the central bank
{ the monetary authority" (p. 146). Similarly, I have shown that in the model sketched here, the
in°ation trend is determined purely by the central bank's policy rule. But this does not mean that
the complete model, including equation (2.3), is incomplete; nor does McCallum suggest otherwise.
12\take as given" the long-run average in°ation rate rather than determining it within
the model; the economic relation through which money growth determines the long-
run in°ation rate \is buried in the constant terms" and \suppressed altogether in the
dynamic equations that are expressed in terms of deviations from the steady state."18
But this is a misunderstanding. While (2.8) represents a solution for the evolution
of the \in°ation gap" (i.e., the deviation of the in°ation rate from the trend ¹ ¼t), the
trend in°ation rate ¹ ¼t is also determined within the system: it corresponds to the
central bank's target rate, incorporated into the policy rule (2.3). Of course one could
determine it in other ways as well; if, for example, one were to close the model by
specifying a loss function for the central bank, rather than a Taylor rule, then one
could derive the trend rate of in°ation from this model of central-bank behavior as
well. (Again it would depend on the central bank's in°ation target, speci¯ed in the
loss function.) The fact that the equations are log-linearized does not mean that
one simply assumes an average in°ation rate; the equations allow one to derive the
average in°ation rate corresponding to a given policy, though one only expects the
log-linearized equations to be accurate if the solution obtained in this way is one
in which endogenous variables such as the \in°ation gap" turn out not to be very
di®erent from the steady-state values around which the equations have been log-
linearized.19 So while it is true that a model like this does not determine the in°ation
rate independently of monetary policy, it does determine the in°ation rate without
any reference to money growth and without any need to specify additional relations
beyond those listed above.
18Reynard (2006) criticizes mainstream monetary policy analysis on similar grounds, arguing that
linearized models \focus on relative instead of general price level °uctuations," while the issue of
importance for policy is the control of the in°ation trend (pp. 2-3). Lucas (2006) echoes this view,
stating that a uni¯ed treatment of the in°ation trend and °uctuations around the trend \remains an
unsolved problem on the frontier of macroeconomic theory. Until it is resolved, the use of monetary
information should continue to be used as a kind of add-on or cross-check, just as it is in ECB policy
formulation today" (p. 137).
19The restriction of attention above to the non-explosive solution of (2.6) does not mean assuming
that the variables zt must have zero means, though that is true in the example discussed above if one
supposes that r¤
t is equal to rn
t on average. And if one were not to restrict attention to non-explosive
solutions, there would be a multiplicity of solutions to equation system (2.6), but this problem would
not be eliminated by adjoining a quantity equation to the system. Indeed, it would not be solved
even if the policy rule (2.3) were to be replaced by an exogenously speci¯ed path for the money
supply.
13Some may object that an assumption that the central bank can implement the
policy represented by equation (2.3) over the long run is unwarranted, unless it does
so by paying attention to money growth and not solely to the variables appearing
in the equation. Milton Friedman's (1968) celebrated critique of attempts to peg
nominal interest rates might be cited as illustration of the proposition that pursuit of
an interest-rate rule without reference to the resulting growth in the money supply
can easily lead to eventual infeasibility of the policy. But the set of interest-rate rules
that lead to unstable dynamics of the kind described by Friedman can be charac-
terized simply in terms of the degree to which the nominal interest-rate operating
target responds to variations in in°ation (or the price level), output, and in°ation
expectations; thus one can identify rules that it should be possible to implement
inde¯nitely, and others that one should not be able to implement.20 In the case of
a rule like (2.3), that leads to stable dynamics under plausible assumptions about
expectation formation, there is no problem with the assumption that the rule deter-
mines monetary policy inde¯nitely. Following the rule may imply a stable long-run
rate of growth of the money supply,21 but there is no need to monitor money growth
in order to implement the rule; and the predicted consequences of following the rule
for in°ation and output are the same whether money demand remains stable or not.
2.3 How Gross is the Abstraction from Reality in Ignoring
Money?
Thus far I have argued that there is nothing conceptually incoherent about a model
of in°ation determination that involves no role whatsoever for measures of the money
supply. But is such a model, while internally consistent, nonetheless patently unreal-
istic, so that it would be foolish to base practical analyses of monetary policy options
20Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Preston (2005) provide examples of analyses of this kind, in
the context of a New Keynesian model similar to the one sketched in the previous section, supple-
mented by a model of adaptive expectation formation in the spirit of Friedman's (1968) analysis of
expectational dynamics. These formal analyses con¯rm Friedman's assertion that an interest-rate
peg should lead to explosive dynamics (and hence be eventually unsustainable), but ¯nd that a
Taylor rule satisfying (2.7) is instead associated with stable expectational dynamics, and eventual
convergence to a determinate rational-expectations equilibrium like that characterized in (2.9).
21This will be true if there exists a money-demand relation, such as (2.10) below, that remains
stable over the long run.
14on a model of this kind? One answer to this question would be to point out that
more complicated versions of the model just sketched, such as the model of Smets
and Wouters (2003, 2007), are able to account fairly well for the historically observed
dynamics of in°ation and other key macroeconomic variables in both the U.S. and
the euro area. For example, Smets and Wouters (2007) show that their model com-
pares favorably with atheoretical VAR or BVAR models in terms of out-of-sample
forecasting performance, especially over horizons from one to three years.
Are such models nonetheless obviously unrealistic on dimensions other than those
with which Smets and Wouters are concerned, so that one might nonetheless sus-
pect that this apparent empirical success is accidental | and that the estimated
\structural" relations might not prove to be structural at all, if one were to choose
policies substantially di®erent from those followed over the sample period? Of course
these models, like all models, abstract from a vast number of complications of ac-
tual economies; the practical question is not whether a model is literally correct, but
whether the simpli¯cations that it involves are fatal to a realistic analysis of the types
of questions for which it is intended to be used. Here I wish to focus on whether the
omission of money is likely to distort key relationships that matter for an analysis of
the e®ects of alternative monetary policy decisions.
It is especially important to address a common misunderstanding about the im-
plications of a moneyless model like the one presented above. Such a model does not
require one to believe that e®orts by the central bank to control the money supply
will have no e®ect on the economy, owing to the completely elastic character of the
velocity of money, as held by some extreme Keynesians in the 1950s (the U.K. \Rad-
cli®e Report" being the best-known expression of such views22). It is true that the
model presented above includes no description of a demand for money; derivation
of the relations (2.1) and (2.2) does not require one to take any particular view of
whether money is or is not perfectly substitutable for other ¯nancial assets in private
portfolio decisions. In fact, the equations as written are compatible with a world in
which there is no special role for money in facilitating transactions, and hence no
reason for money not to be perfectly substitutable with any other similarly riskless
nominal asset; and deriving the model in this \frictionless" case is one way to clarify
that the key relationships in the model have no intrinsic connection with the evolu-
tion of the money supply. But despite the pedagogical value of considering that case,
22See e.g., Radcli®e Committee (1959, para. 391).
15the use of such a model to understand in°ation determination in an actual economy
does not require one to suppose that open-market operations are in fact irrelevant,
or that there is not a uniquely de¯ned path for the money supply associated with the
policy described by rule (2.3).
For the model equations presented above are also consistent with the existence of
a well-de¯ned money-demand curve of a conventional sort, giving rise to an additional
equilibrium relation of the form
log(Mt=Pt) = ´y logYt ¡ ´iit + ²
m
t ; (2.10)
in which Mt is the (nominal) money supply in period t, the positive coe±cients ´y
and ´i are the income elasticity and interest-rate semielasticity of money demand
respectively, and ²m
t is an exogenous disturbance to money demand. This standard
\quantity equation" does not contradict any of the equations written earlier; in the
case of a monetary policy of the kind described by (2.3), equation (2.10) simply in-
dicates the way in which the money supply will have to vary as the central bank
implements the interest-rate target speci¯ed by (2.3). Adjoining the quantity equa-
tion to the previous system provides additional detail about what happens in the
equilibrium previously described, and about what is involved in policy implemen-
tation. The additional equation is not needed, however, in order for the model to
predict the evolution of in°ation, output and interest rates under a given interest-rate
rule; and it is accordingly not needed in order to judge whether one interest-rate rule
or another would have more desirable features, as long as the objectives of policy
relate only to the evolution of these variables. One's conclusions about these matters
would be the same regardless of the coe±cients of the money-demand speci¯cation,
or indeed whether a stable money-demand relation even exists.
The model is thus not one that requires the existence of a money-demand relation
such as (2.10), but not one that is incompatible with the existence of such a relation
either. It is thus incorrect to claim, as Alvarez, Lucas and Weber (2001) do, that
models like the one set out above \reject" the quantity theory of money, and can
accordingly be dismissed in light of the empirical support for that theory. No matter
how strong one might believe the evidence to be in favor of a stable money-demand
relation, this would not contradict any of the equations of the \new Keynesian"
model, and would thus provide no ground for supposing that an alternative model is
16needed in order to reach sound conclusions about monetary policy.23
Still less is the model inconsistent with such elementary observations as the fact
that non-interest-earning currency continues to be held even in ¯nancially developed
economies like that of the U.S. It is true that a fully \frictionless" model would not
allow currency to be held if it pays an interest rate lower than the interest rate on
other riskless nominal assets. And it would certainly be a mistake for a central bank
to take literally the prediction of such a model that it should be impossible to raise
short-term nominal interest rates above zero as long as there are no plans to retire the
entire stock of currency from circulation. But one can adjoin to the model a money
demand equation that solves the \paradox" of the existence of di®erent interest rates
on currency and on T-bills (or in the federal funds market), without requiring any
material change in the relations relied upon above to predict equilibrium in°ation.
It may be objected that while an equation of the form (2.10) is not mathemat-
ically inconsistent with the structural relations derived earlier, it is nonetheless not
economically plausible that the transactions frictions that account for the existence
of a \liquidity premium" should not also change the correct speci¯cation of relations
such as (2.1) and (2.2). In fact, it is theoretically plausible that transactions frictions
do have some e®ect on the correct speci¯cation of these structural relations. For
example, if one motivates the existence of a liquidity premium by supposing that
households obtain a service °ow from cash balances, and accordingly write the pe-
riod °ow of utility of the representative household not as U(Ct); where Ct is real
consumption expenditure, but as U(Ct;Mt=Pt); then except in the special case of
additive separability in the two arguments | a familiar case in textbook expositions,
but one that is hard to defend as realistic | the marginal utility of real income
each period depends on the level of real money balances in addition to the level of
consumption. This in turn means that the equilibrium real rate of interest should
depend not only on current and expected future real activity (which determines equi-
librium consumption), as in equation (2.2), but also on current and expected future
real money balances, as discussed in Woodford (2003, chap. 2, sec. 3). This change
in the relation between real activity and the marginal utility of income also implies
that real money balances should generally enter the aggregate-supply relation (2.1)
as well (Woodford, 2003, chap. 4, sec. 3).24
23See, e.g., McCallum (2001) and Svensson (2003) for previous discussions of this point.
24Other, more explicit, models of the way in which cash balances facilitate transactions often have
17The question is how large this correction is likely to be in practice. McCallum
(2001), Woodford (2003, pp. 117-121 and 304-311), and Ireland (2004) all examine
this issue in the context of new Keynesian models that include transactions frictions
of a kind that give rise to a money demand relation of the form (2.10). McCallum
and Woodford each calibrate their model speci¯cations so that the implied money-
demand relation agrees with estimated relations for the U.S., while Ireland presents
maximum-likelihood estimates of a complete structural model using U.S. data on
money growth, in°ation, output and interest rates. All ¯nd that under an empirically
realistic speci¯cation, the real-balance corrections are nonzero, but quite small, and
that they make little di®erence for the quantitative predictions of the model with
regard to a variety of monetary policy experiments.
And even granting that one wishes to take corrections of this kind into account, for
the sake of greater accuracy, it is not obvious that this implies that money balances
should become an important state variable. While in the non-separable case, the
marginal utility of income is no longer a function solely of consumption and exogenous
preference parameters, the missing variable can as well be described as the interest-
rate di®erential between non-monetary and monetary assets (which represents the
opportunity cost of holding wealth in the form that yields transactions services), as
some measure of the quantity of liquid wealth. At least in some cases, expressing
the relationship in terms of the interest-rate di®erential is clearly superior. Suppose,
for example, that the utility in period t is given by a (non-separable) function of the
form
U(Ct;Mt=(Pt ¹ mt));
where ¹ mt is an exogenous disturbance representing changes in the transactions tech-
nology. In this case, the marginal utility of (real) income ¸t will depend on Ct and
Mt=(Pt ¹ mt), and the equilibrium interest-rate di®erential ¢t will also be a function of
those two quantities, so that there exists a functional relationship
¸t = ¸(Ct;¢t)
that is invariant to changes in the transaction technology. (The relationship between
¸t, Ct and Mt=Pt will instead also involve the disturbance ¹ mt.) Using this relation,
one can express the generalized versions of the structural relations (2.1) and (2.2) in
a similar implication; see, e.g., Woodford (2003, appendix, sec. A.16).
18terms of in°ation, output, and two short-term nominal interest rates (the interest rate
on non-monetary assets and the interest rate paid on money, if any), as discussed in
Woodford (2003, chap. 4). Since the payment of interest on money is not commonly
used as an independent instrument of policy, this does not introduce any additional
state variables, though the dynamics of the e®ects of interest rates on in°ation and
output are now somewhat more complex than in the baseline model presented above.
Writing the model in terms of in°ation, output, the nominal interest rate (on non-
monetary assets) and money balances would not only introduce an additional state
variable, but would introduce dependence of all three structural equations on an
additional structural disturbance (¹ mt), that could be eliminated by writing the model
in terms of the cost of liquidity rather than the quantity of liquid balances.
More generally, it is often observed that the basic New Keynesian model abstracts
from ¯nancial frictions of all sorts, when it refers to a single interest rate that is taken
to be both the central bank's policy rate and the unique measure of the relative
cost of current and future expenditure by the private sector. This is obviously an
over-simpli¯cation, and some feel that a more complete account of the monetary
transmission mechanism, distinguishing among the variety of interest rates and asset
returns that co-exist in a typical economy, would inevitably restore an important role
to monetary aggregates as a key determinant (or crucial indicator) of changes in the
structure of asset returns.25 This is too large a topic to address here in detail, but
two brief comments are appropriate.
First, there is nothing essential to the logic of the New Keynesian model that
requires that it abstract from ¯nancial frictions, and extensions of the basic New
Keynesian model to incorporate various types of credit-market frictions have been
proposed by Bernanke et al. (1999), Christiano et al. (2003, 2007), and Goodfriend
and McCallum (2007), among others. To the extent that such frictions are judged to
be of quantitative importance for monetary policy analysis, they can be incorporated
into a mainstream New Keynesian framework; belief that they are important is neither
a reason to reject the empirical relevance of such a framework, nor a reason to consider
25Nelson (2003) argues for this view, though without o®ering a speci¯c theory of how money
is related to other asset returns and how these matter to the monetary transmission mechanism.
Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) present an explicit model with ¯nancial frictions that result in
multiple interest rates, and use it to argue for the quantitative importance of \money and banking"
to the transmission mechanism.
19money and credit developments within a wholly distinct and competing analytical
framework, as under the ECB's \two pillar" strategy.26
Second, it is far from obvious that assigning an important role to credit frictions in
the monetary transmission mechanism implies that the monetary aggregates stressed
in the traditional monetarist literature should be important state variables. For
example, in the in°uential \¯nancial accelerator" model of Bernanke et al. (1999),
the key innovation relative to a standard New Keynesian model is the introduction
of an endogenous wedge between the required ex ante rate of return on investment
projects and the rate of return received by savers, the size of which depends on the
aggregate net worth of entrepreneurs; the evolution of the net worth of entrepreneurs,
in turn, depends mainly on the equilibrium returns to capital. The size and evolution
of this friction have no essential connection with any monetary aggregate, and indeed,
it would be possible to simplify the model, abstracting from the use of cash to facilitate
transactions altogether, without any fundamental change in the model's predictions
with regard to the response of output and in°ation to either real disturbances or
monetary policy (speci¯ed in terms of an interest-rate rule such as (2.3)).27
In this, as in other models of the \¯nancial accelerator" type, the key impediment
to e±cient ¯nancial intermediation derives from the circumstances of the borrowers
(a lack of internal funds or of suitable collateral), rather than some inability of in-
termediaries to obtain su±cient funds to lend, as in traditional discussions of the
\bank lending channel" of monetary policy. Credit frictions of this kind seem more
likely to be quantitatively signi¯cant for economies like the U.S., where there are
many substitutes for bank credit and banks have many sources of funds other than
the supply of transactions deposits; so it is not obvious that variations in the money
supply should have much connection with the relevant credit frictions. Moreover,
even if lending by banks is assumed to play a crucial role (on the ground that other
sources of ¯nance are imperfect substitutes), it would seem to be variations in the
volume of bank credit that would be of greatest macroeconomic signi¯cance, rather
than variations in the volume of those speci¯c bank liabilities that are counted as
26The suggestion of ECB Vice President Lucas Papademos (2006) that one can eventually imagine
the two separate analyses being combined in a \single ... larger pillar" is surely a sensible one, though
it remains to be seen how \prominent" a role there is for money in the eventual synthesis.
27This is illustrated by the work of C¶ urdia (2007), who develops an open-economy extension of
the model of Bernanke et al. that is purely \cashless."
20part of the money supply.28
3 Implications of the Long-Run Relationship Be-
tween Money and Prices
The monetarist argument for the importance of attention to monetary aggregates in
a strategy to control in°ation is above all an empirical one. The association of money
growth with in°ation is argued, as an empirical matter, to be highly robust, con-
¯rmed by data from di®erent centuries, from di®erent countries, and from economies
with di®erent ¯nancial institutions and di®erent monetary and ¯scal policies. Em-
pirical work in the monetarist tradition often emphasizes simple correlations (and
sometimes lead-lag relationships) rather than structural estimation; but it may be
argued that the relations thus uncovered represent more certain knowledge, because
they are independent of any maintained assumption of the correctness of a particular
structural model. Monetarists argue that the causal relation between money growth
and in°ation is as a consequence one that can more safely be relied upon in designing
a policy aimed at controlling in°ation than the relations (such as the Phillips curve)
that make up a structural macroeconometric model.
It is important, then, to consider the nature of the long-run evidence to which
the monetarist literature frequently refers. My goal here will not be to criticize
the soundness of the statistical evidence itself, but rather to ask | even taking the
evidence at face value | how much of a case one can build on it for the importance
of using monetary aggregates in assessing the stance of monetary policy.
While early advocacy of money-growth targets was often based on analyses of
the correlation between money growth and real and/or nominal national income at
business-cycle frequencies, these correlations have broken down in the U.S. since the
1980s, 29 and the more recent monetarist literature has instead emphasized the wide
28Although Goodhart (2007) argues that central banks ought still to pay attention to \monetary
aggregates," his argument is primarily for the signi¯cance of variations in the e±ciency of interme-
diation by commercial banks, and indeed he remarks that he \believe[s] that the rate of growth of
bank lending to the private sector is as, or a more, important monetary aggregate than broad money
by itself" (p. 60).
29See, for example, Estrella and Mishkin (1997), Hafer and Wheelock (2001), and Walsh (2003,
Fig. 1.3). More recently, relations of this kind have been much less stable in the euro area as well.
21range of evidence that exists for a long-run relationship between money growth and
in°ation. This relationship is argued to be more robust, and to su±ce as a justi¯cation
for controlling money growth given a central bank's proper concern with the character
of long-run in°ation trends.
Studies of the long-run or low-frequency relationship between money and prices
are of several types. First, cross-country correlations between money growth and
in°ation, averaged over long periods, typically show a strong positive relationship,
and even a certain tendency of the data points for di®erent countries to fall near
a line with a slope of 45 degrees, as predicted by the quantity theory of money,
at least when countries with very high average in°ation rates are included in the
sample. McCandless and Weber (1995) provide a number of plots of this kind, one
of which (comparing 30-year averages of M2 growth and CPI in°ation for a sample
of 110 countries) was included in Robert Lucas's (1996) Nobel lecture as empirical
con¯rmation of that theory.30 Further cross-country comparisons are presented by
King (2002) and Haug and Dewald (2004).31
Second, low-frequency movements in money growth and in in°ation can be com-
pared in a single country, if su±ciently long time series are available to allow con-
sideration of how low-frequency trends change over time. Bandpass ¯ltering of the
respective time series has become a popular method in studies of this kind; essen-
tially, this means taking long moving averages of the data, so as to average out
high-frequency °uctuations. For example, Benati (2005) compares the low-frequency
variations in money growth and in°ation in both the U.K. and the U.S., using various
measures of money and prices, and data from the 1870s to the present; his bandpass
¯lters retain only °uctuations with a period of 30 years or longer. Even with this
For a recent discussion of the stability of M3 demand in the euro area, and its implications for the
usefulness of \excess liquidity" measures based on cumulative M3 growth, see Bordes et al. (2007).
Fischer et al. (2007) document the reduced reliance on estimated money-demand relations in recent
years in the monetary analysis of the ECB.
30Lucas argues that \it is clear from these data ... that ... the quantity theory of money ... applies,
with remarkable success, to co-movements in money and prices generated in complicated, real-world
circumstances. Indeed, how many speci¯c economic theories can claim empirical success at the level
exhibited in [the ¯gure of McCandless and Weber]? ... The kind of monetary neutrality shown
in this ¯gure needs to be a central feature of any monetary or macroeconomic theory that claims
empirical seriousness" (Lucas, 1996, p. 666). The same ¯gure is repeated, with similar comments,
in Lucas (2006).
31See, however, de Grauwe and Polan (2001) for criticism of evidence of this kind.
22degree of smoothing of the data, several long swings in the rate of money growth have
occurred in each country over the sample period, and the timing and magnitude of
the shifts in the low-frequency trend are similar for both money growth and in°ation.
Similar results are obtained (albeit with shorter time series and hence averaging over
a somewhat shorter window) for euro-area data on money growth and in°ation by
Jaeger (2003) and Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2006).
Another popular approach to studying the long-run relationship between money
growth and in°ation in a single country is cointegration analysis. Two (or more)
non-stationary series are said to be cointegrated if there is nonetheless a linear com-
bination of the series that is stationary. Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2006), for
example, ¯nd that in the euro area, broad money growth and in°ation are each non-
stationary series (stationary only in their ¯rst di®erences), but that the two series are
cointegrated. This implies that they have a common (Beveridge-Nelson) \stochastic
trend": changes in the predicted long-run path of one series are perfectly correlated
with changes in the predicted long-run path of the other series. Moreover, one cannot
reject the hypothesis that the linear combination of the two series that is stationary
is their di®erence (i.e., real money growth), so that a one percent upward shift in
the predicted long-run growth rate of broad money is associated with precisely a one
percent upward shift in the predicted long-run rate of in°ation, in accordance with
the quantity theory of money. Cointegration analysis is similarly used to establish a
long-run relationship between euro-area money growth and in°ation by Bruggeman
et al. (2003) and Kugler and Kaufmann (2005). Thus the results obtained from
all three approaches to studying the long-run relationship between money growth
and in°ation are quite consistent with one another, and with the predictions of the
quantity theory of money.
But what does the existence of such a long-run relationship imply for the use of
monetary aggregates in the conduct of monetary policy? For the sake of argument,
I shall take for granted that the empirical case has been established, and ask what
would follow from this for policy. Of course, there are always questions that can
be raised about the certainty with which econometric results have been established
| claims about the \long run" in particular are notoriously di±cult to establish
using short time series | and about whether correlations observed under historical
conditions should be expected to persist under an alternative policy, designed in order
to exploit them. But I think that the monetarist interpretation of these data is indeed
23the most plausible one, and I shall not challenge it.
In particular, I shall suppose that it has been established that | for example, in
the euro area | there really is a reliable structural equation of the form
logMt ¡ logPt = f(Xt); (3.1)
representing money demand behavior, and holding independently of the monetary
policy that may be followed by the central bank.32 Here f(Xt) represents some func-
tion of both real and nominal variables with the property that, given the exogenous
processes for real disturbances, f(Xt) will be a di®erence-stationary process in the
case of any monetary policy that makes the in°ation rate a di®erence-stationary
process, with an unconditional growth rate
g ´ E[¢f(Xt)]
that is independent of monetary policy. If this is the case, then if in°ation is di®erence-
stationary (or I(1)), money-growth will also have to be di®erence-stationary, and
money growth and in°ation will have to be cointegrated, with a cointegrating vector
[1 ¡ 1]; since ¯rst-di®erencing (3.1) implies that ¹t ¡ ¼t must equal the stationary
process ¢f(Xt): Moreover, the unconditional mean of this process is
E[¹t ¡ ¼t] = g; (3.2)
so that over the long run, the average rate of in°ation will be the average rate of money
growth minus g; regardless of what that rate of money growth may be. The hypothesis
of a relation of the form (3.1) is thus a simple interpretation of the empirical relations
asserted in the literature just mentioned.
The important question is, even granting the existence of a reliable structural
relation of this kind, what are the implications for the conduct of monetary policy?
A ¯rst proposal might be that the existence of a well-established empirical relation of
this kind implies that \cashless" models of in°ation determination are incorrect, and
hence not a sound basis for policy analysis. But this would not follow. As explained
in the previous section, the possibility of explaining in°ation dynamics without any
32Benati (2005) argues that because (in the case of UK data since 1870) the low-frequency relation
between money growth and in°ation has remained similar despite a succession of fairly di®erent
monetary policy regimes, one can best interpret the relation as structural. The same argument had
earlier been made by Batini and Nelson (2001).
24reference to monetary aggregates does not depend on a denial that a stable money-
demand relation exists | it requires only that the system of equilibrium conditions
(including the quantity equation) have a certain recursive structure. I have shown that
a cashless model can be consistent with a standard form of money-demand relation,
and one can also easily show that such a model is consistent with the existence of a
cointegrating relation between money growth and in°ation of the kind often found
empirically.
Let us consider again the same log-linear \new Keynesian" model as above, ex-
tended to include a money-demand relation of the form (2.10), and assume once more
a monetary policy of the form (2.3), with an in°ation target that evolves as a random
walk (2.4) just as in the empirical model of Smets and Wouters (2003). Finally, let us
suppose either that both rn
t and r¤
t are stationary processes, or at any rate that the
di®erence rn
t ¡ r¤
t is stationary, indicating that the central bank succeeds in tracking
variations in the natural rate of interest, at least over the long run. Then the solution
(2.9) implies that the in°ation rate ¼t is an I(1) random variable, with a stochastic
trend equal to ¹ ¼t. First-di®erencing (2.10) furthermore implies that
¹t ¡ ¼t = ´y°t ¡ ´i¢it + ¢²
m
t ; (3.3)
where °t ´ ¢logYt is the growth rate of output. Solution (2.8) similarly implies that
the output gap is stationary, so that as long as the (log) natural rate of output is at
least di®erence-stationary, °t will be stationary. Moreover, (2.2) implies that
it = r
n
t + Et¼t+1 + ¾
¡1Et[°t+1 ¡ °
n
t+1]
= r
¤
t + ¼t + (r
n
t ¡ r
¤
t) + Et[¢¼t+1] + ¾
¡1Et[°t+1 ¡ °
n
t+1];
where °n
t is the growth rate of the natural rate of output, so that it¡rn
t ¡¹ ¼t is a sum
of stationary variables and hence stationary. Since the last two of these terms have
been assumed (or just shown) to be di®erence-stationary, it must also be di®erence-
stationary. Then if we also assume that ²m
t is at least di®erence-stationary, every
term on the right-hand side of (3.3) is stationary, so that ¹t ¡ ¼t is predicted to be
stationary.
It would then follow that ¹t must be an I(1) random variable, like ¼t, but that the
two variables are cointegrated, with a cointegrating vector equal to [1 ¡1]: Hence the
new Keynesian model is consistent with cointegration evidence of the kind found, for
example, by Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2006). This in turn implies that the
25average growth rates of money and prices will necessarily be similar if one averages
over a su±ciently long period of time, as the stationary di®erence between ¹t and
¼t will have a long-run average value of zero. It follows that the theoretical model
of the previous section is equally consistent with the other kinds of \long run" or
\low frequency" evidence cited above. Hence such facts, no matter how thoroughly
established, provide no evidence against the validity of non-monetary models of that
type.33
A second view might be that the long-run relation between money and prices
provides an argument for the desirability of a money-growth target. If a structural
relation of the form (3.1) is believed to exist regardless of the monetary policy chosen,
then it follows that as long as the central bank ensures that the money supply grows at
some rate ¹ ¹ | or at least that the rate of money growth ¹t °uctuates in a stationary
way around the average level ¹ ¹ | then over the long run the rate of in°ation will
have to equal ¹ ¹¡g; on account of (3.2). It is true that such a rule is only guaranteed
to yield the desired rate of in°ation as an average over a su±ciently long period of
time. Nonetheless, it can be argued that such an approach is an especially reliable
way of ensuring the desired long-run rate of in°ation, founded as it is on a robust
empirical relation; and that this is not only one goal of monetary policy, but perhaps
the only one that can be reliably achieved.
But nothing in the argument just given implies that a money growth target is the
only way in which a desired long-run in°ation rate can be ensured. If a structural
relation of the form (3.1) exists, it follows that any policy that succeeds in making
the in°ation rate equal some target rate ¹ ¼ on average over the long run will also have
33In Woodford (2007) I illustrate this through simulation of a calibrated version of the new Keyne-
sian model described above. When the simulated data for money growth and in°ation are band-pass
¯ltered, the low-frequency components exhibit strong comovement of the kind found in historical
data by authors such as Benati (2005) and Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2006). (The low-
frequency movements in money growth even appear to \lead" the low-frequency movements in the
in°ation rate, though this does not indicate any causal priority of the changes in the rate of money
growth.) The simulated data are also consistent with the results obtained by Assenmacher-Wesche
and Gerlach when they estimate reduced-form in°ation equations using di®erent frequency compo-
nents of the data: low-frequency in°ation is mainly \explained" by low-frequency money growth and
output growth, whereas the output gap is instead the most signi¯cant of the regressors \explain-
ing" high-frequency in°ation. The success of this exercise shows that \two-pillar Phillips curve"
estimates do not imply that standard new Keynesian models are incomplete as models of in°ation
determination.
26to make the rate of money growth equal ¹ ¼+g on average over the long run. But this
does not imply that a successful policy must involve a target for money growth; it
need not involve measurement of the money supply at all.
In fact, if all that one cares about is whether an average in°ation rate of two
percent is maintained over a period of several decades, this is quite easy to ensure.
It is only necessary that one be able to measure the in°ation rate itself | and not
necessarily in real time; it su±ces that the lag in data availability be one of weeks
rather than years | and that one be able to tell whether policy is being adjusted
in a way that should lower in°ation as opposed to raising it (for which an interest-
rate instrument su±ces). A suitable policy is then one that monitors the cumulative
increase in prices relative to the two-percent-per-year target, and tightens policy
if prices have risen too much, loosening it if they have risen too little. One does
not need to monitor money growth to tell if an undesirable long-run in°ation trend is
developing; measurement of in°ation itself su±ces for this! As long as one does in fact
know how to measure price increases, and to use policy to accelerate or decelerate the
rate of in°ation (at least over the next few years), there is little di±culty in ensuring
a desired rate of in°ation over a su±ciently long period of time. Of course, there are
signi¯cant practical questions connected with the measurement of current in°ation
at high frequencies, and even greater di±culties in assessing the near-term in°ation
outlook given the current stance of policy; but the existence of a long-term relation
between money growth and in°ation does not imply any advantage of money-growth
statistics in addressing those questions.
Finally, it might be thought that the existence of a long-run relation between
money growth and in°ation should imply that measures of money growth will be
valuable in forecasting in°ation, over \the medium-to-long run" even if not at shorter
horizons. But this is not the case. Cointegration of money growth with the in°ation
rate would imply that if one were to know what the average rate of money growth will
be over some su±ciently long future horizon, one would need no other information in
order to be able to forecast the average in°ation rate over that same horizon. But one
does not know in advance what the rate of money growth over the long run will be
(that is, unless one knows it because the central bank is determined to adjust policy
to ensure a particular rate of money growth). And there is no reason to assume
that the recent rate of growth of the money supply provides the best predictor of
the future long-run rate of money growth. If money were something exogenous with
27respect to the central bank's actions, like the weather, then it might make sense to
try to discern long-run trends from moving averages of recent observations. But the
long-run growth rate of the money supply will depend on future monetary policy
decisions, and there is no sense in which the existence of a \trend" toward faster
money growth in recent years dooms an economy to continue to have fast money
growth over some medium-to-long term.
As a simple example, consider the new Keynesian model presented above, in the
special case in which the interest-rate gap r
g
t ´ rn
t ¡r¤
t is a white-noise process. (This
could be true either because both rn
t and r¤
t are white-noise processes, or because the
central bank adjusts r¤
t to track the changes in the natural rate of interest that are
forecastable a period in advance, setting r¤
t = Et¡1rn
t :) In this case, the solution (2.8)
is of the form
¼t = ¹ ¼t + ar
g
t;
logYt = logY
n
t + br
g
t;
for certain coe±cients a;b: If in°ation evolves in this way, the optimal forecast of
future in°ation at any horizon j ¸ 1 is given by
Et¼t+j = ¹ ¼t = ¼t + (a=b)log(Yt=Y
n
t ): (3.4)
Thus if one uses the current in°ation rate and the current output gap to forecast
future in°ation, one cannot improve upon the forecast using information from any
other variables observed at time t.
Forecasting future in°ation using the output gap alone would not be accurate,
since in°ation has a stochastic trend while the output gap is stationary; one needs to
include among the regressors some variable with a similar stochastic trend to that of
in°ation. But this need not be money growth; in°ation itself is also a variable with the
right stochastic trend, and using current in°ation to forecast future in°ation means
that one need not include any other regressors that track the stochastic trend. What
one needs as additional regressors are stationary variables that are highly correlated
with the current departure of in°ation from its stochastic trend, i.e., the Beveridge-
Nelson \cyclical component" of in°ation. In the simple example presented above, the
output gap is one example of a stationary variable with that property. More generally,
the thing that matters is which variables are most useful for tracking relatively high-
frequency (or cyclical) variations in in°ation, and not which variables best track
28long-run in°ation. This is true regardless of the horizon over which one wishes to
forecast in°ation.
Of course, this hardly proves that monetary statistics cannot be of any use as
indicator variables. In general, central banks use measures of a wide range of indica-
tors in assessing the state of the economy and the likely e®ects of alternative policy
decisions, and it is right for them to do so. There is no a priori reason to exclude
monetary variables from the set of indicators that are taken into account. But the
mere fact that a long literature has established a fairly robust long-run relationship
between money growth and in°ation does not, in itself, imply that monetary statistics
must be important sources of information when assessing the risks to price stability.
Nor does that relationship provide the basis for an analysis of the soundness of pol-
icy that can be formulated without reference to any structural model of in°ation
determination, and that can consequently be used as a \cross-check" against more
model-dependent analyses. To the extent that money growth is useful as an indicator
variable, its interpretation will surely be dependent on a particular modeling frame-
work, that identi¯es the structural signi¯cance of the state variables that the rate of
money growth helps to identify (the natural rate of output and the natural rate of
interest, in their example). Thus a fruitful use of information revealed by monetary
statistics is more likely to occur in the context of a model-based \economic analysis"
of the in°ationary consequences of contemplated policies than in some wholly distinct
form of \monetary analysis."
4 Pitfalls of Phillips-Curve-Based Monetary
Policy Analysis
One of the most important arguments given by the ECB for its \two-pillar" strategy
is a desire to ensure a more robust framework for deliberations about monetary policy
than would result from complete reliance upon any single model or guideline.34 \The
two-pillar approach is designed to ensure ... that appropriate attention is paid to dif-
ferent perspectives and the cross-checking of information.... It represents, and conveys
34This consideration is emphasized by Otmar Issing (2006), who stresses that in adopting a mone-
tary policy strategy for the ECB, the Governing Council was equally unwilling to rely upon monetary
analysis alone.
29to the public, the notion of diversi¯ed analysis and ensures robust decisionmaking"
(ECB, 2004, p. 55).35
The issue of robustness is certainly an important concern in choosing a monetary
policy strategy, and skepticism is appropriate about the accuracy of any currently
existing quantitative models of the monetary transmission mechanism. But is the
practice of \cross-checking" the conclusions of \economic analysis" by monitoring
money growth (along with other related statistics) the most appropriate way of en-
suring robustness? In order to consider the possible advantages of such an approach,
it is necessary to consider what some of the more obvious pitfalls might be of making
policy on the basis of a Phillips-curve-based model of in°ation dynamics alone.36
4.1 The Pitfall of Reliance upon Inaccurate Estimates of Po-
tential Output
One obvious potential problem with basing monetary policy on forecasts of the near-
term outlook for in°ation is that the forecasts may be biased. In such a case, it might
be possible for policy to be more in°ationary than is intended, perhaps even for many
years, because the central bank's biased forecasts persistently predict a lower in°ation
rate than actually occurs on average. One obviously should not wish to make it too
easy for such an outcome to occur, and this is a reason for caution about making
policy on the basis of a single, possibly unreliable, forecasting model.
A Phillips-curve-based short-run forecasting model might be especially vulnerable
to problems of this kind, owing to the crucial role in such a model of the \output gap"
as a determinant of in°ationary pressures. In fact, real-time measures of the output
gap are notoriously controversial, because of the di±culty of recognizing changes in
35The asserted greater robustness of policies that respond to monetary developments is an im-
portant theme of the defense of the monetary pillar by Masuch et al (2003), one of the background
studies for the ECB's re-evaluation of its monetary policy strategy in 2003.
36Here I consider only the question whether the use of information from monetary aggregates as
a \cross-check" (as part of a two-pillar framework) is a particularly suitable way of curing speci¯c
potential defects of a Phillips-curve-based policy analysis. A somewhat di®erent argument, often
made by monetarists, asserts that a monetary targeting rule is more robust than an \activist" policy
based on a speci¯c economic model, precisely because it requires no model for its implementation.
Von zer Muehlen (2001) | originally written in 1982 | remains a useful discussion of the reasons
why there is no logical connection between a preference for robustness to Knightian uncertainty and
choice of a \non-activist" policy.
30the \natural" (or potential) level of output at the time that they occur. Orphanides
(2003a) illustrates how large the mistakes are that may easily be made by comparing
\real-time" measures of the U.S. output gap available to the Fed during the 1970s to
the Fed's subsequent assessment of what the output gap during that period had been.
According to the view at the time (based on estimates of potential output by the Pres-
ident's Council of Economic Advisors), the output gap was negative throughout the
1970s, often by 5 percent or more (including the entire ¯ve-year period between 1974
and 1979), and reached a level as low as -15 percent in 1975. Based on this statistic,
policy might have been viewed as relatively \tight". But from the vantage point of
the 1990s,37 the Fed had substantially revised its view of the output gap during the
1970s: according to the revised data, the output gap was instead positive during much
of the 1970s, and only negative by a few percent even during the worst quarters of the
1974-75 recession. (The key to the change in perspective was an eventual recognition
that productivity growth had been lower during the 1970s than during the previous
two decades | something that had not been immediately recognized at the time.)
This type of mistake | persistently over-estimating potential output for many
years in sequence | could easily result in a persistent in°ationary bias to policy, at
least if the output gap estimate were used to assess the stance of policy in a naive
or mechanical way. This is in fact the explanation of the U.S.'s \Great In°ation"
of the 1970s proposed by Orphanides (2003a, 2003b). According to Orphanides, the
Fed's target for the federal funds rate throughout the 1970s was set in almost exactly
the way that would be implied by a \Taylor rule", with the same in°ation target
and other coe±cients said by Taylor (1993) to characterize Fed policy during the
early Greenspan years. In his interpretation, the similar policy rule resulted in much
higher in°ation during the 1970s because interest rates were kept low in response to
the (incorrectly) perceived large negative output gaps.
This is clearly an important practical problem. Avoiding a repetition of the \Great
In°ation" of the 1970s should be a key goal in the choice of a monetary policy strategy.
It is perhaps too much to expect any strategy to ensure against all possible policy
errors; but a wise policymaker will surely strive at the least not to commit exactly
the same mistake twice.
To what extent would a reliance upon monetary indicators in the conduct of
37At the time of Orphanides' study, the most recent Federal Reserve estimates of historical output
gaps that had been made public dated from 1994.
31policy solve this problem? It is true that, in a model like the one sketched above (to
which we adjoin a standard money-demand relation, such as (2.10)), an in°ationary
policy that arises from an over-estimate of potential output through the mechanism
hypothesized by Orphanides would be associated with a high rate of money growth.
Hence a policy committed to a money growth target, or that would at least respond to
persistent observations of excessive money growth by subsequently tightening policy,
would not allow the in°ationary policy stance to continue, even if the over-estimate
of potential output were to persist for many years (as was the case in the US in the
1970s).
But this is hardly the only kind of policy that would preclude the possibility of
an entire decade of undesirably high in°ation. One did not need the signal provided
by money growth to realize that policy was allowing in°ation to remain high in the
1970s; the in°ation data themselves were evident enough, for many years prior to
the eventual dramatic shift in policy under Paul Volcker (beginning in the fall of
1979).38 According to Orphanides' interpretation of the policy mistake, the Fed was
aware of the rate of in°ation, but nonetheless believed that tighter policy would be
inappropriate, because of the severely negative output gap.39 (Tighter policy, to bring
down in°ation at the cost of an even more negative output gap, would not have struck
a proper balance between the two objectives of stabilization policy.) The additional
information provided by statistics on money growth would not have dispelled this
misconception. There is not, for example, any reason to suppose that if the output
gap really had been so negative, money would not have grown at a similar rate, so that
the facts about money growth should have discon¯rmed the policymakers' analysis
of the situation. For money demand depends on the actual level of transactions in an
economy, not on how that level of activity compares to the \natural rate" | and as
a result money is not especially useful as a source of information about the mistake
38Here I refer to the period following the removal of price controls in 1974. In the presence of
price controls, there is obviously a particular need for indicators of the stance of policy other than
the in°ation rate itself. But signs of distortions created by the controls, of the sort that eventually
required them to be abandoned, should provide an important clue even in the presence of price
controls.
39As noted in section 1, other intellectual errors may have contributed to the explanation of policy
in the 1970s as well, such as skepticism about the ability of monetary policy to restrain in°ation.
But as discussed there, attention to money would not be necessary in order to avoid those mistakes
either.
32that was made in the 1970s.
One thing that would help to avoid this kind of mistake would be the use of
information other than direct measures of real activity and estimates of trends for
those variables (by ¯ltering the observations of these variables alone) in construct-
ing one's estimate of the current \output gap".40 An optimal estimate, based on a
Kalman ¯lter, would take into account the fact that an observation of higher in°ation
than had been expected should lead one to question one's view of how much \slack"
there currently is in the economy, so that in°ation outcomes should themselves be
an important factor in the central bank's estimate of the output gap, as discussed by
Svensson and Woodford (2003). Of course, money growth could also be one among
the indicator variables used in such a ¯ltering exercise, but once again, there is no
reason to suppose that it should receive particular weight, given its lack of any direct
causal connection with the underlying state variable that one is trying to estimate.
Of course, the construction of an optimal Kalman ¯lter is only a complete solution
to the problem of conducting policy under uncertainty when the only uncertainty is
about the economy's current state,41 rather than uncertainty about the correct model
to use. And one should be equally concerned about the possibility of systematic policy
mistakes owing to the use of a model that is incorrect in more fundamental ways.
But the most obvious approach to that problem, in my view, is also one under which
it is important to closely monitor in°ation outcomes, but under which there is no
obvious importance to monitoring money growth as well.
The key to avoiding the possibility of an entire decade of in°ation well above the
target level, even when the model that one uses to judge the current stance of policy
may produce biased forecasts of near-term in°ation, is to be committed to correct past
40In particular, measures of labor costs should be an important additional source of information.
The output gap appearing in (2.1) as a source of in°ationary pressures appears there because, in
the basic new Keynesian model, the average real marginal cost of supplying goods covaries with
the output gap; it is really real marginal cost that should appear in a more general version of the
aggregate-supply relation (Woodford, 2003, chap. 3). This suggests that measures of marginal cost
relative to prices should be valuable in judging when policy is generating in°ationary pressure. In
empirical estimates of the New Keynesian Phillips curve (e.g., Gali and Gertler, 1999; Sbordone,
2002), the level of real unit labor costs has proven to be a useful proxy for this variable.
41Here the \state" is understood to mean the current value of a vector of additive stochastic
terms in the structural equations of one's model, rather than (for example) the current values of the
coe±cients that multiply the state variables in those equations.
33target misses, rather than conducting policy in a purely forward-looking fashion.42
That is, a year or two of in°ation higher than was desired should result in policy
that deliberately aims at an in°ation rate lower than the long-run in°ation target
for the next few years, so as to correct the overshoot and keep a long-run average of
the in°ation rate close to the target despite the temporary deviation. In this way,
even if the central bank uses a model that produces a downward-biased forecast of
in°ation for many years in a row (due, for example, to a persistent over-estimate of
potential output), it will not allow excess in°ation to occur for very long before policy
is tightened.
One simple way to institutionalize this kind of error-correction would be through
commitment to a target path for the price level, rather than only to a prospective
in°ation rate. The two targets are equivalent if the target is always hit, but not
in what they imply about the consequences of target misses for subsequent policy
| thus it is precisely the issue of robustness to model errors (or other failures of
policy implementation) that gives one a reason to choose between them.43 A price
level target path is especially simple to explain, but much the same kind of error-
correction could alternatively be achieved through a commitment to a target for the
average in°ation rate over a period of years, where the period in question would not
be wholly in the future.44
42Orphanides and Williams (2002) propose an alternative way of insulating policy from the con-
sequences of inaccurate estimates of the natural rate of output and/or the natural rate of interest,
which is to set interest rates in accordance with a \di®erence rule" rather than a Taylor rule of
the form (2.3). In the rule that they propose, the change in the interest-rate operating target is
a function of in°ation and the growth rate of output, so that there is no need for any measure of
the levels of the interest rate or of output that are consistent with the in°ation target. As with the
proposal discussed here, the Orphanides-Williams policy is one that makes no use of measures of
money. The desirable features of the Orphanides-Williams rule are related to those the desirable
consequences of price-level targeting described below. For example, in the case of the basic new Key-
nesian model presented above, the Orphanides-Williams rule implies a trend-stationary price level,
so that departures of the price level from its deterministic trend path are subsequently corrected.
43Even if, as is true for most if not all central banks, one does not aim at complete in°ation
stabilization, but is instead willing to trade o® some short-run variation in in°ation for the sake
of greater stability of real activity, a corresponding contrast remains possible between commitment
to an output-gap-adjusted in°ation target and commitment to an output-gap-adjusted price-level
target path.
44This was pointed out by King (1999), who suggested that in°ation targets may lead to error-
correcting behavior, to the extent that a central bank expects its success at meeting its target on
34Many central bankers seem to be resistant to error-correction as an aim in the
conduct of policy, on the ground that \bygones should be bygones" | however disap-
pointed one may be with past outcomes, one should always aim to do the best thing for
the economy from the present time onward, which implies that only purely forward-
looking considerations should be relevant. But this is incorrect reasoning, even in
the case that the central bank has complete certainty about the correctness of its
model of the economy (and about the private sector's understanding the economy in
exactly the same way), to the extent that private-sector behavior is forward-looking,
as models derived from intertemporal optimization imply that it should be. For if
private-sector behavior depends on anticipations of the subsequent conduct of policy,
then the way that the central bank can be counted on to respond subsequently to
target misses has an important e®ect on what is likely to occur on the occasions that
generate those target misses.
For example, in the context of the simple new Keynesian model presented above,
let us consider the policy that would minimize a loss function of the form
E0
1 X
t=0
¯
t[(¼t ¡ ¼
¤)
2 + ¸(xt ¡ x
¤)
2]; (4.1)
representing dual in°ation and output-gap stabilization objectives (with some relative
weight ¸ > 0 on the output objective), in response to exogenous cost-push shocks
of the kind represented by the term ut in (2.1). One can show45 that the optimal
policy is one that will allow in°ation to temporarily increase above the long-run
target level ¼¤ in response to a positive (temporary) cost-push shock, but that will
be committed to subsequently bring the price level back to the path (a path growing
deterministically at the rate ¼¤ per period) that it would have been predicted to
follow in the absence of the shock. It is desirable for people to be able to rely upon
the central bank's tendency to react in this way, for then a positive cost-push shock
will bring with it an expectation of subsequent policy tightening, the anticipation of
which gives people a reason to moderate their wage and price increases despite the
current cost-push shock. The shift in in°ation expectations will partially o®set the
e®ect of the cost-push shock on the short-run aggregate-supply tradeo®, so that the
central bank would not face so painful a choice between allowing signi¯cant in°ation
average over a period such as a decade to be a subject of scrutiny.
45See Clarida et al. (1999) or Woodford (2003, chap. 7) for details of this analysis.
35or reducing output substantially below potential.46
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) similarly show that there are important advan-
tages to a commitment to error-correction in the case that a central bank is tem-
porarily unable to hit its in°ation target owing to the zero lower bound on nominal
interest rates. In the case of a purely forward-looking in°ation target, a period when
the natural rate of interest is temporarily negative | as arguably occurred in Japan
in the late 1990s | can lead to a prolonged contraction and de°ation, owing to the
expectation that prices will not be allowed to rise even when the central bank regains
the ability to hit its in°ation target at a non-negative level of short-term interest rates.
A price level target would instead imply that a period of re°ation should be expected
following any period of price declines due to the binding lower bound on interest rates;
because a greater price level decline would then automatically create expectations of
more future in°ation (causing the zero nominal interest rate during the constrained
period to correspond to a lower real interest rate), such a policy would if credible
limit the price declines (and the associated contraction of real activity) during the
period of the binding zero lower bound.
Thus a commitment to error-correction can be valuable even if the central bank
can be certain of the e®ects of its policy decisions; the argument is only strengthened
when one also considers the uncertainty under which monetary policy is actually
conducted. In an analysis that is especially apposite to our discussion of the policy
errors of the 1970s, Gorodnichenko and Shapiro (2006) note that commitment to a
price-level target reduces the harm done by a poor real-time estimate of productivity
(and hence of the natural rate of output) by a central bank.47 If the private sector
46The optimality of this kind of response to cost-push shocks depends, of course, on details of
the correct dynamic speci¯cation of the in°ation-output tradeo®, as stressed by Batini and Yates
(2003). It is sometimes argued that subsequent reversal of price increases due to cost-push shocks is
only optimal in the case of a \purely forward-looking" version of the new Keynesian Phillips curve
that cannot account for observed in°ation inertia. However, the speci¯cation (2.1) proposed here is
able to account for the observed inertia in in°ation dynamics over the past few decades | i.e., the
failure of in°ation to revert rapidly to a \long run" value that is constant over time | as due to
variation over time in the in°ation target ¹ ¼t of the kind found by Smets and Wouters (2003). Other
interpretations of observed in°ation inertia that would also imply that it is optimal to subsequently
undo price increases due to cost-push shocks are discussed in Woodford (2006).
47Gorodnichenko and Shapiro argue that uncertainty about a possible change in the trend rate
of productivity growth in the US in the late 1990s did not cause the kind of in°ation instability
observed in the 1970s precisely because the Greenspan Fed followed an error-correction policy, as
36expects that in°ation greater than the central bank intended (owing to a failure
to recognize how stimulative policy really was, on account of an overly optimistic
estimate of the natural rate of output) will cause the central bank to aim for lower
in°ation later, this will restrain wage and price increases during the period when
policy is overly stimulative. Hence a commitment to error-correction would not only
ensure that the central bank does not exceed its long-run in°ation target in the same
way for many years in a row; in the case of a forward-looking aggregate-supply tradeo®
of the kind implied by (2.1), it would also result in less excess in°ation in the ¯rst
place, for any given magnitude of mis-estimate of the natural rate of output.
Similarly, Aoki and Nikolov (2005) show that a price-level rule for monetary policy
is more robust to possible errors in the central bank's economic model. They assume
that the central seeks to implement a \target criterion", using a quantitative model to
determine the level of the short-term nominal interest rate that will result in in°ation
and output growth satisfying the criterion. Aoki and Nikolov compare two alternative
target criteria, one speci¯ed as an output-gap-adjusted target for the in°ation rate,
and the other as a gap-adjusted target for the price level; the two policy rules would be
equivalent if the target criterion could be ful¯lled at all times, but they have di®erent
dynamic implications in the case of target misses owing to errors in calculating the
interest rate required to hit the target. They ¯nd that the price-level target criterion
leads to much better outcomes when the central bank starts with initially incorrect
coe±cient estimates in the quantitative model that it uses to calculate its policy,
again because the commitment to error-correction that is implied by the price-level
target leads price-setters to behave in a way that ameliorates the consequences of
central-bank errors in its choice of the interest rate.
Some of the advantages of a price-level target (or alternatively, a commitment to
error-correction) can also be achieved by a money-growth target, if this is understood
as commitment to a target path for the money supply that is not reset each time
money growth di®ers from the target rate | that is, if one does not allow \base drift".
The ECB's computation of an \excess liquidity" statistic based on the cumulative
growth in broad money over several years relative to its \reference value" for money
growth would be consistent with a target of this kind. If excess liquidity results
if it had a price-level target. Their argument assumes that this feature of Fed policy was correctly
understood by the public, despite its not being made explicit in the Fed's public discussions of its
policy.
37in policy being tighter than it would otherwise be, this would tend to correct the
consequences of excessively in°ationary policy (resulting in excess money growth) due,
for example, to an overly optimistic estimate of potential output. This is presumably
the reasoning behind JÄ urgen Stark's statement that \evaluating the money stock and
liquidity situation helps to ensure that central banks look at developments in the level
of key nominal variables, and not just their rate of change" (Stark, 2006).
While this is a valid point, one should note that tracking cumulative excess in°a-
tion | i.e., departures from a \reference path" for the price level | would be even
more e®ective for this purpose than tracking excess money growth. Excess money
growth is an equally useful indicator only to the extent that excess money growth
(over a period of a year or two) is a reliable measure of excessively in°ationary policy.
But money growth can diverge widely from in°ation over a period of several years,
while in°ation itself can be measured fairly accurately within a few months. Thus
the superior method for ensuring robustness against the type of policy error discussed
above would seem to be a commitment to respond to the measured evolution of the
price level itself, without any need to track measures of the money supply.
4.2 The Pitfall of Ignoring the Endogeneity of Expectations
Another well-known potential problem with policy based on an estimated Phillips
curve is the trap of failing to recognize the di®erence between the short-run tradeo®
between in°ation and real activity, that is available for given in°ationary expecta-
tions, and the long-run tradeo® that is available when the eventual adjustment of
expectations is taken into account. The best-known exposition of this trap is in
the analysis of discretionary policy by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (1983). These classic expositions assumed a particular type of expectations-
augmented Phillips curve that was popular in the \New Classical" literature of the
1970s, but discretionary policy has a similar in°ationary bias in a new Keynesian
model of the kind expounded above, as shown in Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford
(2003, chap. 7).
Suppose that each period, the central bank chooses a nominal interest rate it so
as to minimize its loss function
(¼t ¡ ¼
¤)
2 + ¸(xt ¡ x
¤)
2; (4.2)
given the tradeo® between in°ation and output implied by the Phillips-curve relation
38(2.1) and the e®ects of interest rates on expenditure implied by (2.2). Suppose fur-
thermore that in its evaluation of these structural relations, the central bank takes
as given the in°ation trend ¹ ¼t to which price-setters index their prices, and current
private-sector expectations Et¼t+1;Etxt+1; it assumes that none of these are a®ected
by its choice of policy in period t, so that it simply faces tradeo®s of the form
¼t = at + ·xt;
xt = bt ¡ ¾it;
where the intercepts at and bt are independent of the choice of it: Note that the
static loss function (4.2) is consistent with the intertemporal objective (4.1) assumed
above, if the central bank acts in a discretionary fashion (never making any advance
commitments regarding its future policies) and understands (as is true in the Markov
equilibrium of this model) that the choices of ¼t;Yt; and it have no consequences
for equilibrium outcomes in any periods after t. Similarly, the assumption that the
central bank's policy decision will not a®ect expectations (including expectations
regarding the in°ation trend48) is correct if the private sector has rational expectations
and the economy evolves in accordance with the Markov equilibrium. Thus the
assumed behavior of the discretionary central bank does not involve any incorrect
understanding of the e®ects of its policy decision, given that it is only deciding what
to do in the current period.
Given the slope of the (correctly) perceived Phillips-curve tradeo®, the central
bank will choose to achieve the point on that tradeo® that satis¯es the ¯rst-order
condition
(¼t ¡ ¼
¤) +
¸
·
(xt ¡ x
¤) = 0: (4.3)
Let us suppose furthermore, for simplicity, that there are no cost-push shocks ut: Then
since both the objective and the constraints are the same (in terms of the variables
¼t;xt; and it ¡ rn
t ) in all periods, a Markov equilibrium involves constant values for
each of those variables, and the constant value of ¼ will also be the constant value of
the in°ation trend ¹ ¼. Substitution of identical constant values for ¼ and ¹ ¼ into (2.1)
indicates that any Markov equilibrium must involve a constant output gap x = 0:
48Here the indexation rate ¹ ¼t is understood to be de¯ned by (2.5), so that it depends only on
expectations regarding policy far in the future.
39Condition (4.3) then implies that the constant equilibrium in°ation rate is equal to
¼ = ¼
¤ + +
¸
·
x
¤; (4.4)
which is necessarily greater than the target in°ation rate ¼¤; under the assumptions
that ¸ > 0 and x¤ > 0 in (4.2).
This is not, however, an optimal policy, from the standpoint of the bank's own
objectives. In the case of any constant in°ation rate ¼; (2.1) implies a constant output
gap x = 0: Hence the loss function (4.2) is equal to
(¼ ¡ ¼
¤)
2 + ¸x
¤2
each period. This expression is minimized at ¼ = ¼¤; and not at the higher in°ation
rate (4.4). The lower value of losses could easily be achieved by committing to a
policy that delivers the target in°ation rate ¼¤ each period. Thus discretionary policy
results in an in°ationary bias, as in the analysis of Kydland and Prescott and of Barro
and Gordon, even when the central bank correctly assesses the current values of Y n
t
and rn
t ; and more generally, when it correctly assesses the consequences of alternative
possible choices. The bank's mistake is that it only considers the action to take in the
current period, and so fails to realize how it could shape expectations (and hence the
location of the Phillips-curve tradeo® between in°ation and output) by committing
to a policy in advance.
An approach to policy choice of this kind clearly leads to an unsatisfactory out-
come, despite being based on optimization, and I believe that it is generally what
central bankers have in mind when they speak of the importance of maintaining a
\medium-run" or \long-run orientation" for monetary policy, rather than allowing
policy to be dictated by \short-run" considerations alone. It thus represents one
possible interpretation of what the ECB seeks to guard against by insisting that its
\economic analysis" of short-term in°ation risks be subject to a \cross-check" from
a monetary analysis that takes a longer-term perspective.
But would attention to the growth rate of monetary aggregates solve the problem
illustrated by the above analysis? If we adjoin a money-demand relation such as
(2.10) to our model, then the Markov equilibrium with overly in°ationary policy will
also involve a correspondingly high rate of money growth; but once again, one need
not monitor money growth in order to see that the policy is in°ationary. (In the
equilibrium just described, the central bank is under no illusions about the in°ation
40rate resulting from its policy.) Supposing that the central bank monitors the money
supply, that it is aware of the structural relation (2.10), and indeed that it chooses
a target for Mt (rather than it) each period | but again, in a discretionary fashion,
with no commitment regarding future policy | would change nothing about our
analysis above of the in°ation rate resulting from discretionary policy.
Of course, the famous diagnosis of the problem by Kydland and Prescott (1977)
was that monetary policy should be conducted in accordance with a policy rule,
rather than on the basis of a procedure aimed at minimization of an objective such as
(4.1). And at the time that they wrote, a money-growth rule of the kind advocated
by Milton Friedman was clearly what they had in mind. But there is no reason why
a policy rule, intended to prevent the central bank from giving in to the temptation
to exploit the short-run Phillips-curve tradeo®, would have to involve a target for
money growth. If all one cares about is eliminating the undesirably high average
rate of in°ation | or if one ignores the existence of random shocks, as in the simple
analysis above | then any policy rule that implies a suitably low average in°ation
rate would work as well. In particular, an in°ation target will su±ce to eliminate the
problem, if it is taken seriously | if it does not simply mean that the central bank's
loss function (4.2) penalizes deviations from a well-de¯ned target ¼¤; but rather that
the central bank is pledged to ensure that the long-run average in°ation rate remains
within a fairly narrow range.49 As explained above, it is certainly possible to design a
policy framework that will ensure the desired average in°ation rate, over a su±ciently
long period of time, without any reference to monetary aggregates.
Nor is it correct to say that in the discretionary \trap," the central bank's mistake
is reliance upon an inadequate model of the determinants of in°ation or of the e®ects
of policy | one that is accurate in the short run but not in the medium-to-long
run | so that the in°ationary bias of policy could be avoided by basing policy on an
alternative (presumably quantity-theoretic) model that gives a more accurate account
of the determinants of long-run in°ation trends. As I have just noted, the quantity-
49Proponents of \°exible in°ation targeting" sometimes argue that it su±ces that a central bank
have a well-de¯ned loss function of the form (4.1), to which it is publicly committed, and that the
central bank be able to defend its policy decisions as being aimed at minimizing such an objective.
But the discretionary policy, shown above to lead to undesirably high in°ation, has all of these
features. It is therefore important to recognize that a successful in°ation-targeting regime must also
involve a commitment to a decision procedure that does not allow discretionary choice of the policy
action each period that would minimize the loss function.
41theoretic relation (2.10) can be part of the model used to determine the optimal
action each period, without this implying any change in the logic of discretionary
policy. Nor is there any mistake in the central bank's forecast of the in°ation rate
resulting from its policy, either in the short run or later.
The central bank's mistake is instead one of failing to recognize that a sequence of
optimizing decisions about policy in one period, taking as given the way that policy
will be conducted subsequently, does not lead to an optimal overall pattern of action.
It fails to see that committing to a systematically di®erent policy that is maintained
over time would make possible a di®erent in°ation-output tradeo® than the one that
the central bank faces in each of the succession of periods in which it considers
an alternative policy in that period only, owing to the endogeneity of in°ationary
expectations, and the relevance of those expectations to the in°ation-output tradeo®
in (2.1).
In order to avoid making this kind of error, a central bank that seeks to min-
imize an objective such as (4.1) needs to have a correct view of the nature of the
aggregate-supply relation (2.1) and of the nature of private-sector expectations. Be-
lief in a particular view of the relation between money growth and aggregate nominal
expenditure is quite beside the point! While it is true that monetarists like Friedman
and Lucas played a crucial role in the 1960s and 1970s as advocates of the view that
the long-run Phillips-curve tradeo® should be vertical, this view does not follow from
the quantity theory of money itself. The existence of a stable money-demand relation
such as (2.10) implies nothing about the correct speci¯cation of the aggregate-supply
relation. And one could accept the view that a permanent n percent increase in the
rate of growth of the money supply will eventually result in a permanent n percent
increase in the in°ation rate while still believing in a (non-vertical) long-run Phillips-
curve tradeo®; the type of long-run relation between money growth and in°ation
discussed in section 3 would exist even in this case, as long as permanently higher
in°ation has a permanent e®ect on only the level of output, and not its growth rate.
Thus what is needed to avoid such mistakes is not greater attention to the re-
lation between money growth and in°ation or to the estimation of money-demand
relations; it is deeper study of the dynamics of wage- and price-setting, and espe-
cially of the role of expectations in such decisions. But this is precisely the topic
of what the ECB calls \economic analysis" as opposed to monetary analysis. While
the mistake illustrated above may result from an inadequate understanding of the
42nature of the Phillips curve, the problem cannot be solved by resort to an analytical
framework that dispenses with a Phillips curve. And if excessive emphasis on the
importance of monetary analysis draws resources within the central bank away from
the task of improved modeling of wage and price dynamics, the likelihood of policy
mistakes stemming from an inadequate understanding of aggregate supply will only
be increased.
5 Conclusion
I have examined a number of leading arguments for assigning an important role to
tracking the growth of monetary aggregates when making decisions about monetary
policy. I ¯nd that none of them provides a convincing argument for adopting a
money growth target, or even for assigning money the \prominent role" that the
ECB does, at least in its o±cial rhetoric. Of course, this is hardly a proof that no
such reason will ever be discovered. But when one examines the reasons that have
been primarily responsible for the appeal of the idea of money growth as a simple
diagnostic for monetary policy, one ¯nds that they will not support the weight that
they are asked to bear. Thus while one must admit that it is always possible that
monetary targeting might yet be discovered to have unexpected virtues, there is little
ground for presuming that such virtues must exist, simply because of the familiarity
of the hypothesis.
Nor do the arguments o®ered here imply that central banks should make a par-
ticular point of not seeking to extract any information from monetary aggregates.
An in°ation-targeting central bank should make use of all of the sources of informa-
tion available to it, in judging the interest-rate policy that should be consistent with
a projected evolution of the economy consistent with its target criterion (Svensson
and Woodford, 2005). While I see no reason for either the policy instrument or the
target criterion to involve a measure of the money supply, the model used to calcu-
late the economy's projected evolution under alternative policy paths may involve a
large number of state variables; and given that many of the state variables in such
a model are not directly observed, or not with perfect precision, a large number of
other variables may provide relevant information in judging the economy's state and
hence the appropriate instrument setting. There is no reason why a variety of mone-
tary statistics should not be among the large number of indicators that are used by a
43central bank in preparing its projections. But this appropriate use of the information
contained in monetary statistics would not make money a target in its own right,
and neither would it make monetary analysis a distinct basis for forming a judgment
about the stance of monetary policy, independent of the considerations involved in
an explicit economic model of wage and price-setting.
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